

episodic and do not support statistical conclusions covering the entire occupied area. A more convincing picture would have had to take into account the cresting of the religious revival after German civilian authorities unfolded their policies of enslavement, in the wake of military commanders who had sought to placate the people. In this respect, it is significant that the most dramatic religious upsurge took place on the approaches to Leningrad, beyond the borders of the "Ostland."

Alexeev is to be commended for the patience with which he has assembled the fragmentary data to indicate the sweep of the religious movement that affected most of the German-occupied region and played its part in convincing Stalin to come to terms with the church at home. Unfortunately, the pedestrian style of this work and its failure to sketch in the social background of the religious drama limit its usefulness to specialists in the field.

HARVEY FIRESIDE
Ithaca College

THE RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE HISTORY OF THE WAR AS TAUGHT TO SOVIET SCHOOLCHILDREN.
Edited by *Graham Lyons*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, Shoe String Press, 1976. xviii, 142 pp. Plates. \$10.00.

Graham Lyons has edited (from translations made by Marjorie Vanston) a valuable addition to the literature on Soviet history and historiography available in English. *The Russian Version of the Second World War* is actually two books under one cover. The first and main portion of the volume consists of passages selected and translated from two Soviet modern history texts assigned to tenth form secondary school students throughout the USSR. Both texts are authored by a group of Soviet historians and published by Prosveshchenie, under the aegis of the USSR Ministry of Education, in Moscow. One source, *Istoriia SSSR (History of the USSR)*, as Mr. Lyons tells us in his introduction, deals mostly with the military aspects of World War II, while the second, *Noveishaia istoriia (Modern History)* covers the political aspects of the war. In fact, the distinction between the texts is not so pat as this statement would indicate.

The second portion of the volume—called, somewhat misleadingly, the Appendix—is a set of selected excerpts from popular histories and memoirs for Soviet adult general readers, dealing with what Mr. Lyons describes as "the three most controversial actions of the Soviet Union in the period 1939–45: the signing of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939; the Russo-Finnish War, 1940–41; and the Russian refusal to help the insurgents in the Warsaw Uprising" (p. 89). It is puzzling that the comprehensive and authoritative popular history—*The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945*—published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee in 1970, was not used, since it represents a closer parallel to the school texts than the military reminiscences of any individual. Each Soviet account is prefaced by a brief statement in which the editor summarizes the prevailing Western historical version of events, which he also refers to as "the Cold War or anti-Soviet positions on these events" (p. 89), a rather unfortunate phrase given his very laudable intent to present to the reader the Soviet text without editorial comment.

As the preceding comment suggests, the purpose of this book is educational. Mr. Lyons has "conceived this book for the general reader rather than for scholars," and within this framework he has probably been successful. The fact that he has deliberately avoided "cluttering the text with footnotes" will indeed prove an annoyance and diminish its usefulness to those historians who pick it up, although Mr. Lyons

offers to furnish detailed source references on request. The point can be made, however, that even the general reader would be better served by some additional information: for example, publication dates of the texts, and—in the case of the Appendix materials—some indication as to the wartime position, background, and functions of the original authors, whom the reader suddenly encounters out of context in the first person. It would seem also that the book would have benefited from use of illustrations from the quoted texts themselves, instead of items culled from various archives and libraries. Judging from the 1973 edition of *Istoriia SSSR*, at least, photographs and graphics are in good supply, and another dimension of understanding could have resulted by passing along to the reader some sense of the selection of pictorial content.

Despite these criticisms, there is much of value here, both of informational substance and—although this is implied rather than stated—of historiographical context and method. In Lyons's book, we have the basis for a mini case study in comparative historical interpretation: Soviet historians spell out a sequence of events, actions, and imputed intentions which add up to a very different view of the war and an indictment of their Western allies, a mirror image of the resentments and fears depicted by Western historians. Treatments of perceived Western attempts to turn Hitler eastward, Allied procrastinations on the Second Front, separate peace negotiations with the Nazis in 1943, and Lend Lease are of outstanding interest to Western readers. Particularly in the interpretation of the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, the reader confronts two diametrically opposed versions, which cannot be reconciled by mere differences in perception. Mr. Lyons's premise that "if we want to know the feeling of a nation about great events in its history, the best possible sources are its school books" (p. xiv) is well illustrated in the material he presents. His book should be of genuine value to anyone concerned with questions of political socialization and the sociopolitical aspects of historiography, as well as to historians.

NANCY WHITTIER HEER

Immaculate Heart College, Los Angeles

HENRY WALLACE, HARRY TRUMAN, AND THE COLD WAR. By *Richard J. Walton*. New York: The Viking Press, 1976. xii, 388 pp. \$12.95.

This book will provoke. It is unabashed and challenging. It is out of place in the recent Truman renaissance. It is partisan on behalf of the much-maligned Henry A. Wallace. The work, intended for a lay audience, is designed to remind a new generation of Americans that a sincere and courageous man had the energy and intelligence to speak out against a misguided Cold War diplomacy, to offer alternative policies, to run on a third party ticket, and to risk a distinguished political career for principle. Walton is harsh on the liberals in the 1940s, of the Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. persuasion, who engaged in the Red-baiting that the author documents at length.

Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War is part scholarly monograph, part biography, and part political tract. Walton makes good use of the private papers of Wallace, Truman, the Progressive Party, the Americans for Democratic Action, and others. He relies heavily on the often overlooked, encyclopedic *Gideon's Army* written in three volumes by Curtis D. Macdougall. Walton concludes, like Wallace, that the Truman Administration followed an expansionist, militant, and self-righteous Cold War foreign policy. The author simplifies history at points, sometimes slips into a "good guys-bad guys" mold, and does not say much that has not been presented already by John Blum, Norman Markowitz, and others. Although he provides impressive evidence for the virulent anticommunism of the postwar decade, he does not adequately, for this reviewer's taste, explain *why* Americans were so susceptible to the infection. Walton is well read (although Athan Theoharis's fine studies do not appear