

expelled L'ubomír Lipták and Ján Mlynárik. All display a new, intelligent look into Slovak history, while holding to the Communist *Weltanschauung*.

The first part of Steiner's study, terminating in 1948, is based on scholarly research. It presents a balanced picture of Slovakia, rather unusual in a field so marred by national and political biases. While emphasizing the country's achievements, Steiner recognizes its inferior status in the First Republic. I am afraid, however, that the alleged antifascist attitude of the broad Slovak masses is somewhat idealized. Steiner's discussion of the period covering the years 1948-70 depends more on firsthand observations made while he was working as a journalist in Slovakia than on references to sources.

The author argues that "one of the main fallacies in classical Marxism has been precisely an under-estimation of the impact of nationalism in all spheres" (p. 2), and he presents the case of Slovakia as convincing proof of this statement. In the economic sphere, Steiner demonstrates the ambivalent relations between industrial development, discrimination, and Slovak nationalism. Yet one would also like to understand the discriminatory mind of a Czech Communist. The author interprets the thinking of the "Czechoslovakists" during the First Republic, but not that of the Communists of the Federal Republic.

I would contest several of Steiner's interpretations and correct a few mistakes. One correction (p. 65) is important for the Slovak annals: the birthplace of Andrej Hlinka was Černová not Ružomberok (the seat of his parish). But in general this is a timely and important book on modern Slovakia.

YESHAYAHU JELINEK
University of Haifa

THE CIVIL-MILITARY FABRIC OF WEIMAR FOREIGN POLICY. By
Gaines Post, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. x, 398 pp. \$16.00.

The main theme of this book—in contrast with other works that have discussed the role of the army in the internal politics of the Weimar Republic—is the part played by the army command in foreign policy and its connections with the *Auswärtige Amt* in influencing and shaping that policy. What the author demonstrates in great detail is that there was a significant rapprochement between the *Wilhelmstrasse* and the *Bendlerstrasse* after the dismissal of General von Seeckt in 1926. The new leaders of the army—above all Generals Groener and Schleicher—aimed at cooperation with the government (but not with parliament), whereas Seeckt had ignored or opposed the government as well as the Foreign Office "when its policies clashed with what he considered to be the Army's interests" (p. 172). His successors won over the Foreign Office to the army's policy of close military cooperation with Soviet Russia. The Foreign Office also supported the army's illegal measures for the defense of the eastern frontier and its plans for mobilization. Indeed, the one constant factor was the army's bitter hostility to Poland and its determination to revise the eastern frontiers in Germany's favor, if and when an opportunity presented itself. Since this was also the policy of the government, no conflict could arise on that score. It is well known that in this respect there was fairly close cooperation between the army leaders and the *Auswärtige Amt*, especially during the years 1926 to 1930; the reader may have the uneasy feeling that the author has studied a vast number of German records and produced a long book to dot the i's and cross the t's. But Dr. Post differs from other historians in claim-

ing that the German army did not form a "state within the state," because Groener and Schleicher cooperated with the Foreign Office (pp. 96–97). No one can deny that there was a change in the army's attitude in the post-Seeckt period, but the generals continued to pursue their own political objectives, and the army as a whole remained carefully isolated from the general political life of the nation. During the years of crisis after 1930 the army once more became the dominant power in internal politics. Can it really be maintained that the army ceased to be a "state within the state" because its aims for a short time and up to a point coincided with those of the government? If Groener and Schleicher tried to abate the hostility of the officer corps toward the republic, did they really succeed? These questions the author unfortunately does not answer. What he has written is a competent study of a very intricate subject—a rather theoretical study, describing a multitude of schemes, operational plans, and war games which had no chance of ever being realized.

F. L. CARSTEN

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London

DIKTIERTE OPTION: DIE UMSIEDLUNG DER DEUTSCH-BALTEN
AUS ESTLAND UND LETTLAND, 1939–1941. Compiled by *Dietrich A.
Loeber*. Sonderforschungsbereich "Skandinavien- und Ostseeraumforschung"
an der Universität Kiel. Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz Verlag, 1972. 60 + 787
pp. DM 96, paper.

Professor Loeber documents the repatriation to Germany of the German minorities from their ancient homelands in Estonia and Latvia, which they had colonized and dominated for seven centuries. Ordered by Hitler in the fall of 1939, the repatriation was voluntary; but the fear of an impending Soviet occupation and the pressures from Berlin induced almost all the Germans to leave, although frequently their withdrawal was very reluctant—except in 1941, when both Estonia and Latvia, as well as Lithuania, were already overrun by the Red Army.

In a scrupulously documented introductory essay, aided by seven hundred pages of German, Estonian, Latvian, and Soviet government documents, press reports, and memoirs, Loeber succinctly explains what he calls the "imperialist," "racist," and "totalitarian" nature of the Nazi repatriation policies. The reprinted documents also shed light on Soviet-German relations in 1939–40 and on the prospective Nazi colonization policies in Poland and, interestingly enough, in Lithuania. Loeber shows particular concern for the fate of repatriates as human beings who first became pawns of the Nazi government and then received frequently unfair treatment from various authorities after World War II.

Diktierte Option is a voluminous and expensive book and on the surface promises a reading about as interesting as a lawyer's brief. But this appearance is deceptive. The narration records high human and historical drama; it depicts Germany's losses suffered in the Baltic region in this latest round of the thousand-year struggle between the Teutons and the Slavs. In this historical perspective, the omission by the editor of the story of the repatriation of the Lithuanian German minority is easier to understand, though it really should be told in the context provided by Loeber's book.

V. STANLEY VARDYS
University of Oklahoma