Even after the Arab Spring, it has been thought that Arab youth are not deeply invested in the political parties of North Africa. In fact, quite a few are affiliated with various parties but the reasons for their choices and the means by which the parties seek to attract them have been little explored. In this chapter, we look at the choices both male and female youngsters make in deciding whether to affiliate with one or another of the Moroccan political parties. Often, we see, it is less a matter of ideological attachment than social connection, less a way of showing philosophic solidarity than exploring personal identity. The repercussions of this, especially for the more fundamentalist parties and for the monarchy’s approach to them, demonstrate that the encounter with organized political attachment is often more subtle than the overt programs of the parties would seem to indicate.

In a survey that begins by looking at the ways in which post-war Britain gradually escaped from the popular cultural domination of the USA to create a new musical empire of its own, this chapter explores the manner in which home-grown pop reflects upon and influences notions of national identity. While progressive and revolutionary through the creation of new musical styles that sought to change the cultural, social or political landscape, pop has sometimes revealed itself to be nostalgic and backward-looking. This has often resulted in the curation of an Anglocentric musical tradition celebrating national stereotypes, but this is a tradition that has more recently been contested by other sounds, other voices, writing themselves into the pop history of the UK to become an integral part of the equally evolving character of the nation.

The pace of urbanisation across sub-Saharan Africa over the last 60 years is without precedence. In 1950, most African countries were agrarian societies and just over a quarter of the population lived in cities. By 2020, the continent had 74 cities with a population of more than one million people, equivalent to the US and Europe combined. Today almost half of sub-Saharan Africans are urban dwellers and by 2050 that number is projected to reach 60 per cent. That means two- thirds of the continent’s projected population growth over the next three decades – an additional 950 million people – will be absorbed by the region’s humming, thriving, bustling megacities. And, as the OECD notes, ‘this transition is profoundly transforming the social, economic and political geography of the continent.’ Lagos, with a population of more than 20 million and economy bigger than that of Kenya is a vast, energetic and flourishing metropolis, a centre of opportunity that is enabling young Nigerians to be wealthier, more open-minded and more cosmopolitan than any before it.

The pace of urbanisation across sub-Saharan Africa over the last 60 years is without precedence. In 1950, most African countries were agrarian societies and just over a quarter of the population lived in cities. By 2020, the continent had 74 cities with a population of more than one million people, equivalent to the US and Europe combined. Today almost half of sub-Saharan Africans are urban dwellers and by 2050 that number is projected to reach 60 per cent. That means two- thirds of the continent’s projected population growth over the next three decades – an additional 950 million people – will be absorbed by the region’s humming, thriving, bustling megacities. And, as the OECD notes, ‘this transition is profoundly transforming the social, economic and political geography of the continent.’ Lagos, with a population of more than 20 million and economy bigger than that of Kenya is a vast, energetic and flourishing metropolis, a centre of opportunity that is enabling young Nigerians to be wealthier, more open-minded and more cosmopolitan than any before it.

The introduction frames state feminism within the context of authoritarian state-building in Tunisia as elsewhere in the Middle East as offering opportunities and limitations. Marriage reform and marital metaphors were mobilized by modernizing states across the globe, shaping the public-private divide emblematic of secularism and modern conceptions of the nuclear family. Tunisian family law was part of these processes of juridical reform and modernization that expanded state power over both men and women, appropriating men’s patriarchal control over their families. In postcolonial Tunisia, they were undertaken by a single-party state asserting its authority over the religious establishment, the labor movement, and women’s organizing. Continued ties with France and American financial aid shaped Tunisia’s Cold War alliance, perpetuated its position of dependence, and shaped its economic structures in liberal directions despite a period of ostensible socialism. Women’s rights were important to Tunisia’s international image and secured the middle-class, urban base of the ruling party. Yet by bringing women in proximity to the state through its patronage over women’s affairs, they became public personas involved in politics, diplomacy, and cultural life, shaping the image of modern womanhood along the way.

In the highly competitive and conflictual world of early modern China, aggression and violence were a regular part of life. People not only came to blows with other people, but also with ghosts and demons that infested their world with evils and afflictions. The rock fights, cockfights, self-mortifying shamans, sword-wielding exorcists, public floggings and bloody beheadings discussed in this chapter were common spectacles of public violence. China’s educated elites, who associated such acts with vulgar lower-class culture, disparaged popular forms of violence because they were wild, senseless and uncontrollable. For the lower orders, however, violence was purposeful. It gave power to the powerless and prestige to the disreputable. Regular displays were necessary to gain respect and could even ensure social mobility. Violence was essential to masculinity and gave meaning to men’s lives, providing them with ambition and dignity. The shedding of blood also gave meaning to violence. Blood was the vital force of life important in warding off evil spirits, curing illnesses, ensuring fertility and bringing good luck. These acts were part of a well-established, but heterodox, folk tradition whereby violence and bloody rituals were deeply rooted in the everyday life and popular culture of early modern China.

The licensing operation of London County Council was the largest in Britain. Its Public Control Department was a vast licensing bureaucracy that worked with both efficiency and frequent legal recourse to enforce the letter of the law on sexual culture. The evidence shows how closely allied it was to the Public Morality Council, each organisation sharing information on both the current interpretation of the law and on incidents spotted on stage, screen or billboard. London faced cultural changes, especially in relation to 1950s’ revue bars, skiffle music and jukeboxes. But the chapter then goes on to compare London to Blackpool, where a distinctive sexual culture peaked between the 1930s and 1960s in which there was widespread exposure amongst holidaymakers to both sexual and semi-criminal ‘booth’ culture on the foreshore. The chapter argues that the influence of Soho pales beside Blackpool and its 7 million annual visitors, including large numbers from London. Moreover, it shows how licensing control was highly effective in London, but woefully lax in Blackpool, making the latter the location where widespread semi-nudity was first rehearsed in British culture.