This article appraises the effects of trade liberalization between two industries that have different endowments of skilled labor. Skilled labor is necessary for the production of higher-quality variants of a vertically differentiated good. Skilled labor endowments, therefore, determine the patternof specialization of industries as well as their market structure, both in the final goods market and in the labor market. We analyze how market integration benefits or harms the agents in the industries by delving into the linkages between labor and product markets, and show that bilateral losses from trade can emerge at equilibrium.

We investigate positional effects in a vertically differentiated duopoly, evaluated against the first best. Positional concerns distort the allocation of consumers across varieties, as well as the average quality. If the external effect is sufficiently relevant, the resulting welfare loss is increasing in the extent of the externality itself. The beneficial effect of regulation through a minimum quality standard is analysed.

In this article, we consider a demand model for a durable good with unknown quality. The quality of the good is uncertain in the sense that the consumer ignores (ex ante) whether the good will break down or not, higher quality implying a higher probability of survival. Taking into account this uncertainty around the quality, we show that the demand for quality can, paradoxically, decrease when consumers are more risk averse. We prove that this risk aversion effect can disturb the second-order price discrimination policies applied by some firms. We reveal the link between quality demand and self-protection theory.

Des écarts de prix importants sur les marchés automobile européens donnent lieu à des importations parallèles entre les pays de l'Union Européenne. Ce commerce « gris » va-t-il faire converger les prix vers un prix unique, plus concurrentiel ? Cet article a pour objet d'analyser les stratégies de prix d'une firme en monopole sur son marché domestique et en duopole sur un autre marché européen. Le produit est vendu par le biais d'un réseau de distribution exclusive dans les deux pays. La firme peut être concurrencée sur son propre marché par un ou plusieurs arbitragistes tirant partie d'un écart de prix. Nous montrons que lorsque le bien réimporté a une qualité perçue différente du « bien autorisé » et selon l'intensité de la concurrence dans le pays étranger la firme peut avoir intérêt à laisser l'arbitrage (les importations parallèles) se faire et continuer à pratiquer des prix différents entre les deux pays.