This chapter tackles the term “truth” as a criterion of Johnson’s criticism. The central focus is Johnson’s apparent preference for poetical works based on actual events from history. In two exemplary cases from Dryden and Pope there is the implicit suggestion that such an anchorage in history is a merit. But there are many occasions – the defective historical allegory of Absalom and Achitophel and Johnson’s taste for the fanciful imaginings in Shakespeare’s comedies (as against the “Histories”). Here critical judgments cannot be reliably linked to such a preference. Analysis concludes that Johnson sought forms of artistry based in the foundational power of common experience: not the mystical, the occult or the abstruse. This is an emotional need for Johnson: The mind “loves” truth. But such a need in no way excluded the fact that Johnson attached extraordinary value to the poetical imagination; it did not weaken his demand for its presence in poetry.

We first explore how damaging untruth can be, especially in digital lifeworlds. In digital lifeworlds information spreads at a pace and volume unheard of in analog contexts. But misinformation and disinformation spread the same way, which enhances how individuals can tell stories about themselves or have them substantiated in echo chambers in the company of likeminded people. These considerations provide support for a right to truth. However, next we see that untruth plays a significant role as an enabler of valued psychological and social dynamics. The considerations that pull into the opposite direction notwithstanding, there can therefore be no comprehensive right to truth. Contrary to a well-known Bible verse, for most people it is anyway not the truth that sets them free. It is acceptance of worldviews in likeminded company that does so (worldviews that tend to contain plenty of untruths), in any event if being set free means having an orientation in the world. But that there can be no such comprehensive right is consistent with there being a right to truth in specific contexts. Still, the moral concern behind truthfulness is in this context not best captured in terms of an actual right to truth.