This essay examines the relationship between Jean-Luc Marion's argument of ‘conceptual idolatry’ and John Duns Scotus’ doctrine of the univocity of being. I argue that Scotus does fall under Marion's criticisms, which radically undermine the use of ‘being’ in theology, but that univocity, in its barest Scotist form, also seems impossible to avoid. After arguing that attempts to move past this ontological conundrum fail, I conclude the relationship stands at an impasse. While this conclusion is critical, I make it for the sake of a constructive argument: post-metaphysical theology should reckon with the inevitability of being, appreciating this impasse between the apparent hegemony of being and the priority of God's self-revelation. Making the impasse clear at least points the way towards a renewed theological consideration of being.

Explaining genuine moral disagreement is a challenge for metaethical theories. For expressivists, this challenge comes from the plausibility of agents making seemingly univocal claims while expressing incongruent conative attitudes. I argue that metaethical inferentialism – a deflationary cousin to expressivism, which locates meaning in the inferential import of our moral assertions rather than the attitudes they express – offers a unique solution to this problem. Because inferentialism doesn’t locate the source of moral disagreements in a clash between attitudes, but instead in conflicts between the inferential import of ethical assertions, the traditional problem for expressivism can be avoided. After considering two forms of inferentialism that lead to revenge versions of the problem, I conclude by recommending that we understand the semantics of moral disagreements pragmatically: the source of univocity does not come from moral or semantic facts waiting to be described, but instead from the needs that ethical and semantic discourses answer – a solution to the problems of what we are to do and how we are to talk about it.

This article offers a reading of Richard of St Victor's medieval treatise On the Trinity. It suggests that while Richard interrogates the question of trinitarian personhood in innovative ways, his contribution lies in the way he emphasises how nature influences the criteria for personhood with respect to different modes of existence. Thus, while human personhood shares certain features in common with divine personhood, the two concepts must remain distinguishable with reference to the type of natures they uniquely ‘person’. This conclusion may serve to chastise modern forms of trinitarianism which assume ‘univocity’ of divine and human personhood too hastily.