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This chapter argues that the main arguments for substance dualism can be parodied and transformed either into arguments against substance dualism, or into arguments for the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to support substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: modal arguments; an epistemic argument; the argument from the alleged fact that facts regarding personal identity outstrip the physical facts; the argument from phenomenology and intentionality; the argument from the unity of consciousness; Lowe’s argument from unity; and the argument from the problem of the many.

Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)

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4 - Arguments for Substance Dualism

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Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

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2 results

4 - Arguments for Substance Dualism

Summary

Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness