The author takes a detailed look at decision-makers’ plans for unified commands in the Pacific from 1947 onwards and elaborates on the debates within the Truman administration over naval deployment in post-war East Asia and its overall international security goals. The author further argues that the wartime competition for leadership in the Pacific between MacArthur and Nimitz did not end with World War II but persisted in the immediate post-war period. The United States regarded the Pacific as its lake, but the United States’ Navy–Army division resulted in it being a divided lake in terms of authority: the Army led the Far East Command and the Navy held the Pacific Command according to the 1947 unified command plan. This chapter also shows the inextricable link between international and regional turbulence and America’s construction of unified commands in the Pacific. Mainland China, which the US Navy chose as a springboard where it could build its maritime order in post-war East Asia, was not included in either the Far East Command or the Pacific Command. Truman administration’s ambiguous China policy and the Navy–Army competition for leadership in the Pacific blurred the contours of America’s maritime East Asia.