Most contemporary research on clientelism focuses on “electoral clientelism” – a phenomenon that exclusively delivers benefits during election campaigns. Chapter 2 demonstrates that electoral clientelism is undermined by substantial institutional and legal challenges. First, it presents a typology of distinct strategies of electoral clientelism and introduces a theoretical framework explaining how politicians employ strategies. The chapter shows why two key factors – rigorous ballot secrecy and stringent compulsory voting – pose significant challenges for vote buying, turnout buying, and abstention buying during Brazilian campaigns. Given these challenges, many politicians use campaign handouts to import outsiders into their municipalities, but this expensive tactic is also hindered by extensive voter audits. The chapter then turns to yet another major challenge facing electoral clientelism in Brazil, the enactment of a new law against campaign handouts that has ousted over a thousand politicians from office. Amidst such challenges, electoral clientelism has declined in Brazil, though some politicians still employ its risky and unreliable strategies as a secondary measure.