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1 results

  • Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

  • Alireza Kazemi
  • Journal:
    Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie / Volume 59 / Issue 3 / September 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    24 February 2020, pp. 437-457
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  • In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.