To the elemental question of what is the nature of intellectual property, the conventional answer is that it is ‘intangible’ and hence has no physical existence. This is because, it is said, there is a fundamental dichotomy between the immaterial subject matter that is protected by an IP right and its embodiment in some material object. This chapter revisits the elemental question and comes to the conclusion that the conventional view mis-states the position. In particular, while it is true that IP laws recognise something like the tangible/intangible duality, properly understood the rights granted by those laws do not attach to the immaterial subject matter; rather, they attach to the material object in which the subject matter is embodied. More specifically, while the class of things in respect of which IP protection may be granted includes intangibles, it also includes tangibles. Moreover, the things in that class are material – in that they are perceptible by a human sense.

Chapter 4 analyzes the doctrine of patentable subject matter. Delving into American, European, and Japanese patent jurisprudence, it first describes how these legal systems handle software-related inventions in general. Next, it applies that jurisprudence to 3D printable files to demonstrate why only one of the three 3D printing file formats is likely to constitute patentable subject matter. More intriguingly, it turns out that this file format is of least interest to would-be patent holders. In other words, a patent protection gap exists. Chapter 4 also analyzes jurisdictions’ differential treatment of patent claims directed to electronic signals. The Japanese and European patent systems consider these claims to be patentable subject matter, whereas the U.S. system does not. The upshot is that patent protection for software and 3D printable files is weaker in the United States because most 3D printable files are sold as internet signal transmissions. I argue that the United States should provide protection for signal claims.