Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

6 results

  • 3 - Empirical Evidence of Monopsony in Labor Markets

  • Brianna L. Alderman, Harvard University, Massachusetts, Roger D. Blair, University of Florida
  • Book:
    Monopsony in Labor Markets
    Published online:
    08 February 2024
    Print publication:
    15 February 2024, pp 32-49

  • Summary

    We provide an overview of the empirical results with ample references to the literature. There is a substantial body of research that establishes the pervasive presence of monopsony in labor markets. The root cause of monopsony power lies in the fact that labor markets are imperfect. In other words, labor supply functions are positively sloped, which allows the dominant employers to depress compensation by reducing employment. Moreover, there are various frictions that reduce an employee’s ability to respond to alternative employment opportunities. These include costs of job search, turnover, and mobility barriers.

  • 8 - Noncompete Agreements

  • Brianna L. Alderman, Harvard University, Massachusetts, Roger D. Blair, University of Florida
  • Book:
    Monopsony in Labor Markets
    Published online:
    08 February 2024
    Print publication:
    15 February 2024, pp 125-140

  • Summary

    Here, we focus on non-compete agreements (NCAs). NCAs severely limit job mobility and reduce a worker’s opportunities to exploit their human capital. Most NCAs preclude a worker’s ability to obtain a position with a rival employer for six months to two years after separation. In addition, the former employee may not start their own business in the same industry. The economic result of these restrictions is to reduce the labor supply elasticity, which enhances an employer’s ability to depress employee compensation, other benefits, and working conditions.

    Employers argue that they need NCAs for two primary reasons. First, upon separation, an employee could take the former employer’s trade secrets to a rival employer. An NCA may solve this problem because many trade secrets, such as short-run production plans, are short-lived. Second, employers often invest in an employee’s human capital with schooling or training. An NCA provides protection for such investments in human capital.

    In this chapter, we examine the pros and cons of NCAs. We also examine the Federal Trade Commission’s proposal to ban all NCAs completely.

Monopsony in Labor Markets
  • Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy
  • Brianna L. Alderman, Roger D. Blair
  • Published online:
    08 February 2024
    Print publication:
    15 February 2024
  • The economics of monopsony power results in lower wages and other forms of compensation, as well as reduced employment. Wealth is transferred from workers to their employers. In addition, the employer's output is reduced, which leads to increased prices for consumers. Monopsony in Labor Markets demonstrates that elements of monopsony are pervasive and explores the available antitrust policy options. It presents the economic and empirical foundations for antitrust concerns and sets out the relevant antitrust policy. Building on this foundation, it examines collusion on compensation, collusive no-poaching agreements, and the inclusion of non-compete agreements in employment contracts. It also addresses the influence of labor unions, labor's antitrust exemption, which permits the exercise of countervailing power, and the consequences of mergers to monopsony. Offering a thorough explanation of antitrust policy, this book identifies the basic economic problems with monopsony in labor markets and explains the remedies currently available.

  • Producer Expectations and the Extensive Margin in Grain Supply Response

  • David Boussios, Andrew Barkley
  • Journal:
    Agricultural and Resource Economics Review / Volume 43 / Issue 3 / December 2014
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    15 September 2016, pp. 335-356

  • Grain supply is the joint effect of both area and yield; however, research often targets either one or the other. The research presented here estimates the complete supply elasticity of grains using novel approaches to approximate producers’ price and weather expectations on both yield and acres planted. The results from this approach combining acreage and yield show the negative impact of expanded production on average yields and the supply response. Additionally, the research extends previous methods of approximating producers’ price expectations through the use of historical basis prices.

  • Monopsonistic Food Processing and Farm Prices: The Case of the West Alabama Catfish Industry

  • Henry Kinnucan, Gregory Sullivan
  • Journal:
    Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics / Volume 18 / Issue 2 / December 1986
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    05 September 2016, pp. 15-24

  • Increasing concentration in food processing has important economic implications for agricultural producers and consumers. This paper addresses the issue by focusing on a case where pure monopsony conditions appear to hold–catfish processing in West Alabama. Farm-level impacts of the market power imbalance are described via a six equation theoretical model. Results show price elasticity of farm supply governing the economic incentive to the processor for exploiting its market power: less (more) elastic supply implies greater (lesser) divergence between competitive and monopsony price. The theoretical model is operationalized using an indirect procedure recently suggested by Houck for estimating farm level supply elasticities. Based on these supply elasticities and historical prices, the model predicts a 12-35 percent potential reduction in prices received by West Alabama producers as a result of market power imbalance.

  • Panel Data Estimation Methods on Supply and Demand Elasticities: The Case of Cotton in Greece

  • Christina Kotakou
  • Journal:
    Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics / Volume 43 / Issue 1 / February 2011
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2015, pp. 111-129

  • This article examines the effects of the application of panel data estimation methods on a system of equations with unbalanced panel data. We apply pooled, random-effects, and fixed-effects estimation in three data sets: small, medium, and large farms to examine the relationship between farm size and the elasticity of cotton supply with respect to cotton price. Our results indicate that the adoption of various estimation methods entails different estimated parameters both in terms of their absolute value and in terms of their statistical significance. Additionally, the elasticity of cotton supply with respect to price varies according to farm size.