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strength of reasons

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Chapter 6 - Reasons for Belief and the Primacy of the Practical
from Part II - Beings of Action in Thought
Andy Mueller, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Book:

Beings of Thought and Action

Published online:

25 June 2021

Print publication:

08 July 2021, pp 140-168
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Summary

I develop a novel account of pragmatic encroachment in this chapter. According to this account, there is pragmatic encroachment on the strength of one's reasons for belief, which results in pragmatic encroachment on all notions sensitive to the strength of one's reasons for belief. In section 6.1, I introduce some motivation for the kind of account that I will develop. In section 6.2, I give an informal theory of the strength of reasons for belief. In section 6.3, I explain how this theory plus assumptions about the function of belief lead to pragmatic encroachment on the strength of reasons for belief, which makes it that the practical has primacy over the epistemic. In section 6.4, I deal with objections and in section 6.5, I suggest how to handle cases of ignorant and apparent high stakes.