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Violent Islamic extremism is affecting a growing number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In some, jihadi Salafi organizations have established home bases and turned into permanent security challengers. However, other countries have managed to prevent the formation or curb the spread of homegrown jihadi Salafi organizations. In this book, Sebastian Elischer provides a comparative analysis of how different West and East African states have engaged with fundamentalist Muslim groups between the 1950s and today. In doing so, he establishes a causal link between state-imposed organizational gatekeepers in the Islamic sphere and the absence of homegrown jihadi Salafism. Illustrating that the contemporary manifestation of violent Islamic extremism in sub-Saharan Africa is an outcome of strategic political decisions that are deeply embedded in countries' autocratic pasts, he challenges conventional notions of statehood on the African continent, and provides new insight into the evolving relationships between secular and religious authority.
The chapter analyses the evolution of state-Salafi relations in Niger, Chad, and Uganda between the late 1980s and today. These three countries demobilized political and jihadi Salafism with the help of the organizational gatekeepers that these countries had created in the 1970s. Although the organizational gatekeepers experienced institutional change, they remained in place and undercut activist Salafism.
The chapter analyses the historical evolution of state-Salafi relations in Mali, Mauritania, and Kenya between the late 1980s and today. It outlines the consequences of the absence of organizational gatekeepers in the Islamic sphere. Mali, Mauritania, and Kenya became radicalizers of their domestic Salafi communities.
The chapter summaries all empirical findings and answers the two research questions at the heart of this study. It applies crisp-set qca (csqca) to identify necessary and sufficient condition for the two outcomes of interest. It discusses the relationship between political and jihadi Salafism.
The chapter analyses the historical evolution of state-Salafi relations in Mali, Mauritania, and Kenya between the 1950s and late 1980s. In these three countries critical junctures in the Islamic sphere remained absent. The chapter shows how post-independent governments supported Salafi activities. As a result the Salafi creed could spread unhindered.
The chapter critically discusses the normative implications of book's empirical findings. Drawing on survey data, it shows that a majority of African Muslims approve of some degree of religious regulation. It calls for more African participation in the debate surrounding religious liberty. It also outlines the further implications of the book for the study of statehood in Africa.
The chapter analyses the historical evolution of state-Salafi relations in Niger, Chad, and Uganda between the 1950s and late 1980s. It identifies critical juntures in the Islamic sphere and the factors allowing for the emergence of these critical junctures. In Niger, Chad, and Uganda organizational gatekeepers were created to regulate access to the Islamic sphere. As a result, the Salafi creed was unable to establish a viable following throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
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