This chapter reviews the four primary stages of private criminal justice – enforcement, settlement, adjudication, and punishment – and evaluates potential legal reforms to optimize the benefits and minimize the costs of the private criminal justice system. For the enforcement stage, the chapter rejects current attempts to subject private police to the constitutional rules that regulate public police, and instead recommends decreasing the burdens of filing a civil lawsuit against private police who violate the law. For the settlement stage, the chapter proposes legalizing criminal settlements and abolishing most “duty to report” laws. For the adjudicative stage, the chapter recommends a flexible standard of due process along with a robust privilege for private adjudicators and atraining and licensing scheme. For the punishment stage, the chapter again argues in favor of increased civil liability, but argues against changing the definition of self-defense used by most jurisdictions.

In some situations, it may be advantageous for a government to allow buyers or sellers to cooperate on prices and output to keep a lawful monopolist or a lawful monopsonist, respectively, in check. Although it may seem anticompetitive at first, allowing this behavior is a way to even the playing field and can lead to a socially optimal solution. The parties will find it in their mutual self-interest to select the quantity that maximizes the surplus, which is the competitive quantity. This market structure with actors on both sides acting as a single monopolist is known as bilateral monopoly. In many local markets for physician services, reimbursement rates (payment for services) are dictated by large health insurers who wield monopsony power. In an effort to blunt the buying power enjoyed by the health insurer, physicians have attempted to collectively bargain for the sole purpose of negotiating reimbursement rates. In this chapter, we examine the case for collective bargaining by physicians.

Health care professions are regulated by state licensing boards, which are charged with promoting public health, safety, and welfare by preventing charlatans, incompetents, and quacks from practicing. Typically, these boards are populated by members of the profession being regulated since they have the requisite expertise to police the profession. However, professionals with the power to grant licenses may have a financial incentive to use that power to reduce competition and exclude other medical professionals. Reduced competition leads to higher prices and reduced access to health care. Concerned about this conflict of interest, the Supreme Court in North Carolina Dental agreed that the state should supervise such boards through the state action doctrine. In this chapter, we explore the competitive concerns economists and the antitrust Agencies have regarding professional licensure regulations. We identify two general antitrust concerns: (1) the exclusion of some competitors through entry limitations or practice restrictions and (2) supervision requirements that make the employment of competitors less attractive.