This article aims to explore the new normal in lawmaking during the COVID-19 pandemic. It proves how the pandemic has affected the making of legal norms, in terms of both process and content. It argues that COVID-19 legislation is largely driven by scientific data for the sake of public health. In this context, it explains how national-decision making is influenced by expert advisory bodies that attempt to specify how public health may be preserved during a pandemic crisis. Moreover, it sheds light into the fact that law-making during the first phases of the pandemic was approved and endorsed by the populations of states, due to their fear of the unknown disease. However, as the pandemic steadily became an established truth, the public’s trust in lawmaking started to decrease. These shifts are well explained if one conceives lawmaking by expertise as a sliding scale, the ends of which are legality at one end and expertise coupled with popular acceptance at the other. This unique sliding scale depicts how COVID-19 lawmaking functioned, balancing between opposite trends.

In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary. We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified based on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making.

Financial income play a big part for the calculation of the minimum premium and maximum premium of a sliding scale for non-proportional treaties. The aggregate loss for the XL is supposed to be a compound Poisson process. It is computed by Panjer's Algorithm. Some numerical results are shown for different values of the claims number and the interest rate.