Faced with a growing volume of settlement fails in 1969, the FOMC approved a novel program to lend Treasury securities to primary dealers for the purpose of avoiding redelivery fails.

Chapter 7 explores other reforms implemented, ostensibly in response to the crisis, suggesting that the federal government’s efforts to protect homeowners were well intentioned but ineffective for millions of borrowers. The post-crisis reforms aimed ostensibly at relieving hardship for home borrowers created a new set of incentives for lenders and brokers to exploit mortgage holders. Ultimately, consumer mortgage borrowers paid dearly - financially, socially, emotionally, and physically for the decision by legislators to bail out banks and other financial institutions rather than direct some of those substantial resources to millions of borrowers whose homes were lost. Regulators allowed the programs to be administered by the very predatory lenders that had created the problems. The statute that was ultimately enacted did not assist families in saving their homes. It encouraged, but did not require, lenders to modify loan terms, and did not require them to reduce any principal owing.