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2 results

  • 7 - Corporate Governance and the Political Economy of the Company

  • from Part II - Corporate Law, Financial Markets and Sustainability
  • Edited by Beate Sjåfjell, Universitetet i Oslo, Christopher M. Bruner, University of Georgia
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability
    Published online:
    25 November 2019
    Print publication:
    12 December 2019, pp 86-99

  • Summary

    This chapter argues that the legal architecture of the company obfuscates the political relationship between shareholders and employees and transforms captured value from employees into a transferable and fungible property form. It sets out this claim within a Marxian analysis of the political economy mapped onto the legal architecture of the company. Following on from this analysis, the chapter also demonstrates that recent initiatives that exhort shareholders to govern the company and to monitor company executives – through, for example, the rapidly proliferating Stewardship Codes – attempt to subvert the legal and economic nature of modern shareholders as rentiers, to ill effect.