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  • 4 - Responsibility of States for Wrongdoing

  • from Part I - International Responsibility of Public Institutions: Public and/or Private?
  • Edited by Samantha Besson, Collège de France, Paris
  • Book:
    Theories of International Responsibility Law
    Published online:
    01 September 2022
    Print publication:
    08 September 2022, pp 93-116

  • Summary

    Can States determine unilaterally what counts as a wrongful behaviour in the absence of public international adjudicative institutions? Can meaningful responsibility for wrongful acts exist in the absence of a public adjudicative entity? What happens in the case of a conflict between a unilateral (private) judgment of a State accused of having committed a wrong and the decision of a (public) international adjudicative institution? The authors advocate for a system based on conflicting judgments concerning responsibility made both by international adjudicative institutions (publicly) and by the States themselves (privately), what they refer to as the ‘discordant parity hypothesis’. The case for the overriding power of international adjudicative institutions is based on the importance of the State’s publicly recognized duties. The case for the overriding power of judgments made by States stems from its promise to facilitate active engagement of States with their obligations. The chapter embraces a system that recognizes the normative force of both (and the inevitable resulting conflicts).