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This paper addresses the phenomenology of emotion dysregulation, focusing on borderline personality disorder (BPD). We emphasize how (a) emotions ordinarily arise within the context of a structured experiential world, (b) emotions play a role in maintaining, repairing, and reshaping that world, and (c) both the world's stability and the workings of emotion processes depend on our being able to relate to other people in certain ways. We go on to show how, if (a), (b), and (c) are accepted, emotion dysregulation (of the kind associated with BPD) is implied by a way of experiencing and relating to the social world as whole. Hence, it is not to be conceived of simply as a matter of disordered emotion. Rather, it involves emotions operating upon a disordered world. Furthermore, given that other people play essential roles in sustaining a structured, practically meaningful world and regulating the emotions that arise within it, emotion regulation and dysregulation turn out to be interpersonal, rather than wholly intrapersonal, in structure.
This chapter utilizes dialogical self theory (DST) to construct an account of experiences of self-diminishment in schizophrenia. It suggests that many disparate accounts of self-diminishment may be understood as involving lost or weakened capacities for intrapersonal and interpersonal dialogue. The chapter outlines how losses of this kind appear to assume at least three different forms. It describes models of self-disturbance from psychoanalytic, phenomenological and existential vantage points in order to be able to compare them later with the dialogical approach and then articulates the advances offered by DST. Each view reports an overall sense of compromised agency and a felt lack of meaning among persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. The chapter returns to the claims of DST within a larger discourse concerning self-experience in schizophrenia and shows how our account squares with a range of three other descriptions of alterations in self-experience, including those from psychoanalytic, phenomenological and existential perspectives.
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