In Section 1 of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume claims that those who deny the reality of morals are disingenuous. He notes that philosophy has had a history of disagreements about whether morals originate in reason or sentiment. Throughout his book, Hume applies an experimental method to find the “universal principles” from which morality is derived. Then, in Appendix 1, he argues for the origin of these principles in sentiment or taste, a product of “the human fabric.” Reason, Hume says, discovers objects “as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution.” Taste “has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” How can the quest for universal principles find a satisfactory answer in taste, a “productive” faculty? How is the notion that morality is a “new creation” consistent with an insistence on the reality of moral distinctions? Are the deliverances of taste, which are prompts to virtue, also judgments that can be evaluated as true or false? This essay shows that, on a proper reading, the elements of Hume’s moral epistemology in the second Enquiry are largely consistent.

Section 5 of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “Why Utility Pleases,” is a remarkable text for a variety of reasons. First, there is no directly analogous section in the Treatise, so it raises questions about whether Hume engaged in substantial revision of his previous thought. Second, it offers evidence of a normative moral theory. Third, because Hume discusses the role of utility so favorably, it may suggest a nascent form of utilitarianism. Finally, “Why Utility Pleases” advances some of the few positions that draw criticism from Adam Smith. This chapter addresses each of these features. In response to the first, I argue that there are important differences between the Treatise and Section 5, but none that involve a rejection of the claims of the earlier work. In response to the second, I argue that “Why Utility Pleases” is best interpreted as falling squarely within Hume’s descriptive moral psychology. In response to the third, I argue that the notion of Hume as a utilitarian is dubious. Finally, in response to the fourth, I suggest that the disagreement between Smith and Hume, though nuanced and interesting, is not deep.