Motivated by both science and empire, European explorers increasingly ventured into the high Himalaya after 1800, where they encountered the insidious yet little understood effects of altitude sickness. They did not, however, do so alone. Tensions arising from the highly unpredictable distribution of symptoms were exacerbated by explorers’ dependence on pre-existing networks of labour and expertise, which forced them to measure their bodies against those of their Asian companions. This article examines altitude physiology in the early nineteenth century, largely overlooked by scholars in favour of the more systematic scientific studies of the later period. I consider engagement with indigenous explanations (resulting from poisonous miasmas from plants), the tropes travellers used in their accounts to avoid inverting hierarchies around bodily performance, and attempts to quantify symptoms and instrumentalise bodies by measuring pulses. I argue that high mountains became spaces of comparison, intensified by uncertainty over the scientific status of altitude sickness, and use this to bring into focus the practical, everyday aspects of relationships between explorers, guides, and porters. By considering comparisons at multiple scales, this article also historicises the formulation of high mountain medical topographies in the context of upland frontiers and imperial expansion.

This article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.

The practice of climate simulation takes place in a polarized social and political context. In this paper some methodological aspects of the practice of climate simulation are addressed and the potential value-ladenness of modelling assumptions is discussed. I claim that there is clearly a plurality of values guiding climate simulation efforts with climate scientists themselves also commonly holding different political views on the climate-change problem. There exist climate models of varying levels of concreteness and with different basic assumptions, and the modelling approaches behind these models are valued differently by different groups of climate scientists. The social and political context in which the climate modelling is done plays a role in these value judgements. In order to prevent one particular group of models from dominating the field for social and/or political reasons, the climate-modelling community should acknowledge the vital and necessary role of plurality in the practice of climate science and should stimulate reflection within this practice. Finally, while the IPCC partly addresses the issue by presenting model ensembles, the uncertainties in climate simulation should be better communicated to policy makers and politicians.