In this article we consider the Australian Football League Players’ Association (AFLPA) initial fixed percentage of revenue pay request for the 2012–2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Australian Football League (AFL) in the context of theoretical predictions of models of player salaries in both settings of profit-maximising and win-maximising clubs. We then explore the AFL data from 2001–2009 and show that the declining share of player salaries as a proportion of revenue is consistent with the predictions from these theoretical models. This poses the question of what the league and the clubs do with the additional revenue if they are not paying it to the players. We explore alternative talent investments (better coaching, improved facilities) as a club strategy and the changing spending on game development as a league strategy.

Natural resources trust funds have been employed in the developed world since the 1970s in order to achieve a fair allocation of revenues and promote social growth. This model has been applied recently in developing economies, however lacking transparency and democratic oversight. As a result of increased public spending and depletion of the funds' assets, instead of economic growth, Dutch disease set in when oil prices fell. The World Bank-inspired Chad trust fund is the only of its kind with some external oversight and a contractual obligation by the recipient state to use the fund's earnings for social development. The idea is commendable, but implementation has been slack and if this model is to work in the future the Bank must condition similar loans to full external oversight, otherwise the whole operation will remain a farce.