Recently, Luis R. G. Oliveira has developed the ‘symmetry challenge’ as follows:
(1) If God exists, then for all actual instances of evil e, God has justifying moral reasons for allowing e (the ‘reasons’ thesis).
(2) If God has justifying moral reasons for allowing e, then we have justifying moral reasons for allowing e as well (symmetry thesis).
(3) So, if God exists, then for all actual instances of e, we have justifying moral reasons for allowing e (Oliveira, 2023).
Thus, per Oliveira, given God’s sovereignty over evil, there is no ethical asymmetry which would compel a moral agent to prevent rather than permit a preventable evil. In this paper, I will defend the asymmetry claim and argue that Oliveira’s argument ultimately fails. First, I will sketch Oliveira’s argument. Then, I will briefly articulate a broadly Reformed-Thomistic model of providence which I will deploy in this article. Third, I will argue that this model of providence and the ethical aim of the Christian life generate two distinct yet inter-related reasons to hold to the asymmetry claim. Finally, I will canvas several theodicies my model rules out and anticipate several objections.
