Innovative conceptions of the soul flourished in the past century. Worcester and McComb discussed the subconscious as the soul, that unknown aspect of ourselves. The subconscious was the source of religious experience. Myers’ “subliminal self” produced automata that upsurged across the threshold of consciousness; while automata could be pathological, they could also be indicative of the future evolution of the personality. James speculated about souls beyond the individual, even of the earth itself. Jung articulated an understanding of the soul and of psychical reality. Holt recognized soul in the form of consciousness as the “cross-section.” Holt recognized form in “the wish,” as organizing consciousness and behavior. These innovations represented a shift in emphasis from the figural of mental life—consciousness—to its ground. They shifted the conversation about the soul from it being an efficient cause of mental life to it being the formal cause of mental life.

Today, the soul appears in psychology as a noun, as an adjective, and as a verb. First is soul as a noun, where debates over dualism loom large. Dualism still has a place in psychology. Second is soul as an adjective: psychical reality. Casey and Meissner distinguish psychical reality from the “subjective” by finding that this reality can be shared. Psychical reality relates to what is given to an experiencing person. To discern this reality, one must participate in the unfolding of what is experienced. For Christou (1963), psychological experience has two aspects: “subject-object unity” and “dramatic quality” (p. 75). Third is soul-as-verb, that is, soul as activity, creative activity, imaginative work, or in general, “soul making.” This section concentrates on the archetypal psychology as well as its critics. The book ends by delineating characterizations of the soul developed in the book, a psychology with soul in a soulless psychology.