Cet article s’efforce de démontrer que la détermination de l’objet du différend par la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ) est une constante dans l’appréciation de sa compétence ratione materiae dans le contentieux des mesures conservatoires. D’une part, l’objet du différend fonde la compétence ratione materiae de l’organe judiciaire principal de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), à travers la clause compromissoire contenue dans le traité liant les parties au différend, et d’autre part, cette compétence conditionne la détermination de l’objet du différend. L’influence réciproque des deux notions en fait des notions clefs du contentieux des mesures conservatoires devant la CIJ. Par ailleurs, l’interprétation de son pouvoir d’indication des mesures conservatoires au titre de l’article 41, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice confère à la cour la possibilité d’en indiquer aux fins de non-aggravation du différend, dont le sens et la portée soulèvent de sérieuses interrogations. Au-delà des questionnements portant sur leur possible “déconnection” de l’objet du différend et de la fonction des mesures conservatoires, les mesures conservatoires indiquées aux fins de non-aggravation du différend participeraient d’une certaine manière des buts et principes de l’ONU et plus précisément du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

Le 7 décembre 2021, la Cour internationale de Justice a rendu deux ordonnances attendues dans les affaires introduites par l’Arménie contre l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Azerbaïdjan contre l’Arménie. Elle y confirme une tendance à l’appréciation souple de certains critères d’indication des mesures conservatoires, comme celui de la plausibilité des droits allégués et des liens entre ceux-ci et les mesures requises, voire à la marginalisation d’autres critères, comme celui du caractère irréparable du préjudice invoqué. Bien que la cour de La Haye poursuive, au fil de sa jurisprudence, la construction du droit des mesures conservatoires, la manière dont elle mobilise ces critères continue ainsi de susciter des interrogations et critiques.

In 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.

On June 3, 2016, the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court) rendered its first default judgment, in a case brought by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) against Libya for alleged violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter). The Commission had alleged that the Libyan government had violated its obligations under the Charter to protect one of its citizens, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi, from incommunicado detention and to provide him access to counsel. When Libya failed to respond to the Commission's complaint and to the Court's order of provisional measures, the Court proceeded to the merits and found Libya in violation of several articles of the Charter. Its decision reflected both a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights obligations even in situations of exceptional political and security instability.

This article analyses the barriers that expectant mothers face in accessing appropriate, quality medical services in Kenya, and investigates the potential for the regional African human rights adjudicator to use provisional measures (PMs) to protect expectant mothers. The article aims to explore whether PMs adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights could be an appropriate legal tool to secure protection for expectant mothers who are dealing with obstacles in obtaining the medical services that they need. In that regard, this contribution suggests that the situation of certain expectant mothers in Kenya meets the two necessary conditions to grant PMs under the African Human Rights system: that the situation is urgent and the measures are necessary to prevent irreparable damage. It suggests that, following the tendency of other international human rights bodies, the Commission has the potential to play a relevant role in the context of maternal mortality.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) continues to hear and determine the contentious cases submitted to it, keeping up what has been referred to as an acceptable ‘cruising pace’. After recalling the extent to which the demands on the Court have increased, and the practical means available to it have been greatly extended, the author (following up an earlier article on the subject in the Netherlands International Law Review) examines the Court's recent case-law (decisions given since 2010) to show how each decision, besides furthering settlement of the specific dispute, has contributed to the enlargement or development of international law. Attention is concentrated, however, on particular questions: the role of peremptory norms (jus cogens); interpretation of treaties; questions of jurisdiction (including the problem of the existence of a justiciable dispute in each case); and certain incidental proceedings contemplated by the Court's Statute and Rules, namely provisional measures and intervention under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute.

Jurisdiction — ICSID Convention, Article 25(1) — Scope of “legal dispute” — Relationship between ICSID and ICC arbitration — Admissibility of a claim concerning ICC award — Claim not abuse of process — ICSID Tribunal not a controlling body of ICC arbitration — Whether immunity in favour of domestic judiciary

State responsibility — Whether courts qualify as State organs — ILC Articles on State Responsibility — Attribution to be examined in merits phase

Foreign investment — Whether ICC award an investment — Whether residual contractual rights crystallized by ICC award an investment — ICSID Convention, Article 25(1) — Scope of an investment — Conclusion of contract as an investment — “Salini” test — Duration of contract not an applicable criterion — Irrelevance of origin of funds, unless expressly limited — Use of local funds for investment — Advance payment and assessment of commercial risk

Expropriation — Expropriation through decisions of national courts or tribunals — Court decisions as “measures having similar effects” to direct expropriation — Immaterial rights capable of expropriation — Contractual rights to arbitrate — Measures depriving of the benefit of ICC award — Governmental nature of an expropriation act — “Sole effects” doctrine — Requirement of “illegality” — Assumption of jurisdiction by local courts over arbitration not illegal per se — Illegality of revocation of arbitrators — Abuse of rights by courts

Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of local remedies — ICSID Convention, Article 26 — Exhaustion of remedies a substantive requirement — No applicability in expropriation law — Obligation to exhaust effective remedies, not resort to “improbable” remedies

Provisional measures — ICSID Convention, Article 47 — Discretion of tribunal — Requirements of necessity and urgency — Consideration of the parties’ divergent interests — Measures to prevent the increase of harm suffered by party

Applicable law — Whether tribunal bound by previous decisions — Duty to adopt solutions decided in previous cases — Legitimate expectations of parties — Harmonious development of international investment law

On 18 September 2013, a team of Greenpeace activists attempted to board the Prirazlomnaya oil platform, situated within the Russian exclusive economic zone, intending to disrupt drilling activities and raise awareness of Arctic environmental issues. This action resulted in the subsequent arrest of 30 individuals associated with the protest, as well as that of the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace support vessel sailing under the Dutch flag. The plight of the so-called ‘Arctic 30’ dominated global headlines until their release under a general amnesty by Russia in December 2013. Meanwhile, the arrest of the vessel prompted the commencement of arbitral proceedings by the Netherlands against Russia, a process that had yet to be concluded at the time of writing. In November 2013, however, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea upheld a Dutch petition for provisional measures, including the release of the vessel and its crew subject to the payment of a bond. In so doing, the Tribunal faced the issue of non-participation by a respondent state for the first time, while also developing arguably a ‘back-door’ position on prompt release. In the meantime, aspects of the legality of environmental activism at sea remain somewhat uncertain which, given that a considerable number of protest vessels are registered to the Netherlands, may engage the litigative attention of the Dutch authorities in future incidents.

On December 15, 2012, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal or ITLOS) ordered Ghana to resupply and, upon payment of security, to refuel and release the Argentine naval frigate ARA Libertad, which was being held by authorities in the Ghanaian port of Tema. The Tribunal ordered release of the vessel in response to Argentina’s request for provisional measures under Article 290(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention or UNCLOS). The Tribunal accepted Argentina’s prima facie showing that the Libertad, a tall, three-masted sailing ship commissioned in the Argentine Navy being used as a training vessel for officer cadets, qualifies as a “warship” under Article 29 of UNCLOS, and was therefore entitled to immunity and release to avoid irreparable harm to Argentina pending the final outcome of the case (paras. 93–95).