In their ground-breaking philosophical investigation of the ‘practice turn’ Lechner and Frost prompt a standpoint debate in international relations theory, which touches upon the relationship between practice theory and its subject matter. Lechner and Frost decidedly opt for an internal standpoint, which promises to understand a social practice in terms of the meaning-in-use of its participants. This article argues that the internalist promise will ultimately remain unfulfilled, however, for the aim of collapsing the distinction between the ‘language of action’ and ‘language of observation’ is epistemologically impossible. Taking such an ‘internal’ perspective not only underestimates the problem of the double hermeneutic. It also disregards the gap between theory and practice. Any social enquiry that fails to acknowledge this gap inevitably becomes externalist, for it misses to reflect on its own normative presuppositions. The way ahead is to address this gap reflexively by way of a triple hermeneutics that is bolstered by abductive reasoning.

Practice Theory and International Relations will challenge all you’ve come to know about the practice turn in international relations. It will ask you to question how you define practices and call for more precision. It will challenge your starting point of ground-up actions in everyday life and look at practices from above. It will push you to rethink your empirical methodology and call out sociological approaches as misconceived. And yes, it will ask you to reread Hegel and bring philosophy back in to your practice theorising. In short, it will make a lonely, and for many, unwanted call for a U-turn in the field. In this review, I’ll take up this call for a U-turn back to philosophical foundations, and ask what is gained and what is lost in rethinking practice theory from a philosophical perspective.

Reification – the act of treating something socially created as if it were real – is often described as a problem in the study of international norms. Critical and post-colonial scholars argue that reification silences alternative worldviews, whereas practice-oriented scholars argue it diminishes agency and practical innovation. In his article ‘From Norms to Normative Configurations,’ Simon Pratt proposes a solution to the problem of reification, reconceiving norms as a configuration of interrelated social practices. In this piece, I argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Reification is an essential part of how norms are constructed, contested, and surmounted in international politics. I revisit the foundational figures in norms research to highlight problems in Pratt's analysis, and prove the value of reification, both analytically and methodologically. Then, I use these insights to amend the concept of normative configuration, redefining it as a complex network of discrete norms tied together through common social practices. Along the way, I offer directions for future research on the relationship between norms and practices.

The question of change has emerged as one of the main conceptual and empirical challenges for International Relations' practice turn. In the context of international law, such a challenge is brought into particularly stark relief due to the significant development of legal meaning through more informal, interpretive avenues, including through the judgments of international courts. This paper develops a framework for theorizing how interpretive legal practices generate normative content change in international law. Specifically, it uses the example of the development of international criminal law through the decisions of international criminal courts to analyze how legal interpretation can lead to normative change in practice. Drawing on interviews conducted with judges and legal officers at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), I analyze how a community of legal practice centered around these courts was able to construct and alter legal meaning in international criminal law, and how such a potential for change was curbed by understandings of the interpretive process and the role of international courts dominant among international lawyers.

This article contributes to the communities of practice (CoP) literature by focusing on the neglected role of the boundary in constructing community. It takes issue with advocates of International Relations’ (IR) most recent ‘practice turn’ who have overrated inclusive practices of linking to the detriment of taking account of exclusive practices of demarcation. A conceptual turn to the boundary, understood as a ‘site of difference’, highlights how the two sets of practices operate simultaneously in creating shared senses of belonging to a community. The article empirically probes this turn to the boundary by studying how the postmodern community of the European Union (EU) is (re)constructed by EU diplomats in its neighbouring state Ukraine. As a borderland, it symbolises an interstitial zone of high connectivity where the EU’s otherwise latent order is unearthed. A reconstructive analysis of interviews with members of this ‘community of practice’ reveals that they function as ‘boundary workers’ who engage in both boundary-spanning and boundary-drawing practices on an everyday basis. Zooming in on the ‘boundary work’ by EU diplomats exposes the complex process of community-building and thereby helps grasp community as an emergent structure of possibilities whose meaning is contextually mediated by its members’ social experience of the boundary.