The chapter outlines a mentalist theory of ethics and law. It clarifies its background in the cognitive revolution of the twentieth century. It discusses mayor conceptual elements like the distinction of competence/performance, performance errors and experimental design and the poverty of stimulus argument. It outlines a detailed descriptive account of principles of moral cognition generating richly structured moral judgments. The content of justice, duties to care for others and respect for human beings are specified. New findings from child psychology indicate that children in early, preverbal states of development operate with normative principles. Approaches like the social intuitionist model and recent theories of moral ontogeny are considered, including models of statistical learning. The epistemology of ethics is a central concern of this chapter, particularly the epistemological merits of universalist accounts of human rights. The argument shows that epistemological universalism does not exclude the possibility of a legitimate pluralism of concrete attempts to bring to life the imperfectly understood (at least by this author) meaning of justice, solidarity and dignity.