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2 results

  • Kant on Mind-Dependence: Possible or Actual Experience?

  • Markus Kohl
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 28 / Issue 2 / June 2023
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    24 April 2023, pp. 239-258
    Print publication:
    June 2023
    • Article
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  • In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects of a (suitably qualified) possible experience.

  • Chapter 3 - From ‘Facts’ of Rational Cognition to Their Conditions: Metaphysics and the ‘Analytic’ Method

  • Edited by Peter Thielke, Pomona College, California
  • Book:
    Kant's Prolegomena
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    21 October 2021, pp 48-70

  • Summary

    The Prolegomena, and in particular the regressive argumentative strategy it adopts, provides the real location of Kant’s transcendental arguments, rather than the first Critique, which instead employs a progressive approach. A recognition of this analytic method allows us to see the restrained optimism Kant holds toward metaphysics. Just as pure reason serves as a source for the a priori elements in fact found in mathematics and science, so too can it provide the basic concepts and propositions of metaphysics. While Kant denies that we can have cognition of the objects of traditional metaphysics, his more optimistic attitude extends to the possibility of specifying the conditions on the boundary between cognition and its grounds, which provides us with actual positive metaphysical cognition, even if we can never penetrate beyond the bounds of possible experience.