Fundamental rights to positive state action are costly. An allocation in favor of one individual rightsholder always results in lower allocations in favor of others. The dominant approach in fundamental rights doctrine assumes these conflicts can be resolved judicially by balancing competing rights and other public needs. In practice, carrying out an in-depth balancing in resource allocation cases proves challenging but constitutional courts developed different strategies and concepts to deal with costly rights. The European Court of Human Rights applies a “wide” margin of appreciation and requires that positive state obligations do “not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.” Following the German Federal Constitutional Court, several constitutional courts have applied a concept known as the “proviso of the possible.” The proviso of the possible constrains positive rights and results in a wide margin of discretion granted to political authorities. This article attempts to investigate the specific meaning of the “proviso of the possible” in the context of European fundamental rights law by comparing it against alternative doctrinal concepts. The investigation aims to identify common legal principles and methods to deal with fundamental rights conflicts over scarce public resources.