This chapter suggests two sorts of objections that mere outward conformity of a person's action with general principles of justice is all that can be required by justice even if not by ethics. It engages with both these objections, though pays more attention to the first and flags the second objection. The chapter sets out the systematic objection to the possible inclusion of Kant's philosophy of Right in his moral philosophy. It also argues that if one starts from central concerns of the Doctrine of Right, the text's distinctly public morality comes into focus. This chapter draws on Kant's late Wille/Willkr distinction in order to tease out the distinctive nature of public juridical willing: surprisingly, in the political context, autonomy as self-legislation is simply irrelevant. It explores how individual political judgment relates to public willing; and discovers crucial differences between Kant's political morality and Kant-inspired current liberalism.

Much recent writing on Immanuel Kant's 'kingdom of ends' gives it a semi-political interpretation, representing it as the normative ideal of a democratic order of mutually legislating citizens of equal moral standing. This chapter provides remarks on Kant's substantive practical metaphysics. It makes a case for a metaphysical interpretation of the kingdom of ends formulation (FKE) as part of Kant's analysis of the categorical imperative in Groundwork II. The will's power to act in accordance with the representation of laws applies in relation to hypothetical imperatives as well as to categorical imperatives. The chapter gives an idea of a spontaneous ethical order with the constructed, more limited endeavour of Kant's Rechtsstaat, suggesting that we have good reason not to confuse a juridical order with an ethical one. The coercive character of political morality is a corollary of its interpersonal nature.