What is the most fundamental challenge facing democracies today? One major concern is democratic backsliding, regression, or the rise of “illiberal democracies.” Another concern, closely related, is the rise of “populism,” at least in certain forms, such as those that are fundamentally anti-pluralist and view the “people” as a “moral, homogenous entity whose will cannot err,”1 or, in less virulent form, those that express impatience with institutional structures and norms – such as judicial review, independent institutions, or separation of powers – that stand in the way of direct, unmediated expression of the “popular will.” Good reasons exist for these concerns across many democracies today. But, in my view, the deepest and perhaps most enduring challenge to democratic governments across the West that has emerged in recent years is what I call “political fragmentation.”2 Put briefly, political fragmentation is the dispersion of political power into so many different hands and power centers that it becomes extremely difficult to marshal enough political power and authority for governments to function effectively.

This chapter deploys the book’s theoretical framework, which connects political competition, police autonomy and informal regulation of illicit markets. While the electoral costs of police corruption and violence can motivate politicians to reduce police autonomy, political fragmentation and turnover condition whether and how they can achieve this objective. Fragmentation may obstruct policy implementation but also inhibit politicians from centralizing police rent extraction, while turnover impedes sustaining policies that reduce police autonomy over time. Police autonomy will shape how the police regulate drug markets. With greater autonomy police broker particularistic negotiations with, or engage in unbridled violence, or particularistic confrontation, against dealers and traffickers. When politicians reduce police autonomy through politicization, they capture rents from criminal activities and produce coordinated protection rackets, defined by high corruption but also lower violence on both sides. Finally, professionalized police forces regulate drug trafficking through coordinated coexistence regimes, brokering informal agreements that limit violence by both police and criminals.

Courts are political institutions. And judges do not operate in an institutional or ideological vacuum, as they are shaped by the social, political, and economic struggles that take place within their political systems. Where the strategic environment confers discretion on the courts, the judges can construct a constitutional identity for their jurisdiction distinct from their government’s vision and redefine the polity’s place in the world. And this constitutional convergence in East Asia will endure so long as the political system in each jurisdiction remains fragmented, the courts continue to be independent and judges choose to align their local jurisprudence with Western human rights law.

Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea have the only courts in Asia that regularly use a structured four-stage Proportionality Analysis system to invalidate laws. They also have the only courts in Asia that routinely apply innovative constitutional remedies such as Suspension Orders and Remedial Interpretation to rectify constitutionally flawed legislation. This book explores the constitutional convergence in East Asia and explains its limits.

There are two inter-related institutional reasons for this judicialization of public law norms, which promotes this constitutional convergence within East Asia. First, in each jurisdiction, judicialization is fostered by a fragmentation of power within the political branches of government, which hampers the ability of the government of the day to pursue a unified legislative agenda efficaciously. Second, judicialization is facilitated by an independent judiciary. Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea have the most liberal courts in Asia precisely because of the political fragmentation in their constitutional systems, and the insulation of their judges from the control of one dominant party in government, which allow for independent liberal judges to be regularly appointed to the highest court. And these liberal judges in turn can choose to hand down liberal rulings when they secure a majority on the bench.

This chapter explains why the federal government’s decision to deploy the military in a War on Drugs against the cartels led to a five-fold increase in violence. We argue that acute political polarization and partisan conflict between Right and Left, and the bitterly contested 2006 presidential election, motivated the War on Drugs.The federal government developed interventions in states where the president’s conservative co-partisans ruled, but deliberately neglected leftist governors – the president’s main political rivals – and then blamed the violence on them. We use time-series cross-sectional models to show that between 2007 and 2012 drug violence was more intense in leftist-governed municipalities, not because of incompetence but due to conflict between a Right-wing federal government and leftist governors. We present a natural experiment comparing the intensity of criminal violence in nearly identical municipalities located across the state borders of Michoacán (ruled by the Left) and Jalisco (ruled by the Right). This partisan conflict explains why municipalities on the Michoacán side of the border experienced significantly higher levels of violence than those in Jalisco.

Chapter 5 discusses the evidence presented in the preceding four chapters and its overall significance for the understanding of the development of Egypt during the Third Intermediate Period. The chapter discusses a series of interconnected characteristics identified within Third Intermediate Period culture and society which relate to the political and economic power of regions, the nucleation of both settlements and people, self-sufficiency at a collective and individual level, defence, both physical and spiritual, regionality in terms of settlement development and material culture, and finally elite emulation through objects. These characteristics are also discussed in association with the themes of continuity and change/transition compared with the previous New Kingdom, and also within aspects of the (Egyptian) north and (Libyan) south socio-cultural and socio-geographical divide.