In 2001 sport hunting was reintroduced in Uganda around Lake Mburo National Park, and in 2008 at Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, to derive economic benefits for communities and thus reduce human–wildlife conflict and change communities’ attitudes towards wildlife. We used the policy arrangement approach to analyse and compare the development of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. Through interviews and document review we learned that the arrangement at Lake Mburo changed considerably over time, whereas that at Kabwoya remained relatively stable. The two policy arrangements started with small constellations of actors but turned out to be complex arenas, mainly involving disagreement regarding the benefits. Land ownership proved to be a crucial factor in explaining the differences between the arrangements. Our results also show that benefits do not change communities’ attitudes towards conservation, thus questioning incentive-based policies for conservation. We argue for a careful analysis of the complex social, cultural and political contexts in which conservation and development policies are implemented, to better understand their outcomes.

To address human–wildlife conflicts and the related threat of extinction of the African lion, in 2003, the Maasailand Preservation Trust established a fund at the Mbirikani Group Ranch in southern Kenya to provide monetary compensation for livestock killed by wildlife. In this paper, the policy arrangement approach (PAA) is used to analyse this arrangement as a form of payment for environmental services (PES). Although there has been a considerable reduction in the number of lions killed, the analysis reveals several limitations of this arrangement, including three main side effects, namely it has initiated a process that is difficult to sustain or reverse, created a new cycle of dependence and widened the gap between different groups in the community. In conclusion, the drawbacks of this type of compensation fund must be addressed by combining such arrangements with other public and private policies and initiatives. Careful examination and comparison of different kinds of experiments with PES-like arrangements are required to further build understanding of the potential and different contributions of public and private, market-based initiatives in biodiversity governance.