This chapter describes three views of Wittgenstein, corresponding to three ways of thinking about the so-called 'linguistic turn in philosophy'. It provides a three-cornered debate. In one corner are the naturalists, who want to get past the linguistic turn. In another, the pragmatic Wittgensteinians think that replacing Kantian talk about experience, thought and consciousness with Wittgensteinian talk about the uses of linguistic expressions help us replace worse philosophical theories with better ones. In the third, the Wittgensteinian therapists, for whom the importance of the linguistic turn lies in helping us, realize that philosophers have failed to give meaning to the words they utter. The people in the first corner do not read Wittgenstein at all, and those in the other two read him very differently. The chapter describes the differences between these two readings. The therapists take the last pages of the Tractatus very seriously.

This chapter explores the philosophical theories that attempt to provide guidance when determining the best way to balance the rights of the individual user of Information and Computer Technologies (ICTs) with the legitimate public concerns of the societies impacted by these technologies. It looks at the philosophical justifications for free speech and privacy, as these play out in the use of ICTs where anonymous speech can exacerbate the conflicts regarding pornography, hate speech, privacy and political dissent. The Principle of Harm can be used to distinguish hate speech from the heated and vigorous debates that race and religion can both engender. The Gossip 2.0 phenomenon is a place where free speech and privacy collide head-on. This is antisocial networking, where the dark side of social interaction is leveraged by ICTs to gain a force and audience far beyond the restroom walls where this kind of communication is typically found.

This chapter provides an overview of existing computational (mechanistic) models of cognition in relation to the study of consciousness, on the basis of psychological and philosophical theories and data. It begins by examining some foundational issues concerning computational approaches toward consciousness. Then, various existing models and their explanations of the conscious/unconscious distinction are presented. Work in the area of computational modeling of consciousness generally assumes the sufficiency and the necessity of mechanistic explanations. The chapter looks into some details of two representative computational models, exemplifying either two systems or one-system views. Various related issues, such as the utility of computational models, explanations of psychological data, and potential applications of machine consciousness, have been touched on in the process. Based on existing psychological and philosophical evidence, existing models were compared and contrasted to some extent.