For many city dwellers in Pakistan the distant memory of outdoor cinemas in their ancestral villages rekindles the thrill of first contact with film exhibition. This paper considers attempts made in colonial British India and postcolonial Pakistan to understand, wield, and benefit from the staging of such memorable and affective filmic events. In its cultivation of “cinema-minded” subjects, the British Empire commissioned studies of audiences and their reactions to film exhibition in hopes of managing the unruly morality and materiality of the cinematic apparatus. After Partition and the creation of the Dominion of Pakistan, similar studies continued, evincing a residual strategy of elicited contact. The elicitation of film contact aimed at the exertion and commandment of the event of film exhibition for the purposes of knowing their constituent subjects at a moment of malleability. Yet the Empire's struggle with the perceived problems of “Muslim tastes” and audience members’ ambivalence over rural screenings in post-Partition Pakistan calls for a reconsideration of the efficacy of these tactics. I argue that what complicated these encounters are affective responses that questioned the address, permissibility, and efficacy of film exhibition. In these tactics of elucidation, disenchantment, and denial, ruptures are refused and the new is dismissed as inoperable, incompatible, or impermissible.

Self-ownership theorists argue that many of our most morally urgent and enforceable rights stem from the fact that we own ourselves. Critics of self-ownership argue that the claim that people own their bodies commits self-ownership theorists to several implausible conclusions because self-ownership theory relies on several vague moral predicates, and any precisification of the required predicates is seemingly too permissive (because it allows people to impose deadly risks on innocent bystanders for no reason) or too restrictive (because it prohibits people from polluting or even interacting with others at all). I argue that this line of criticism does not undermine the case for self-ownership theory because self-ownership theory does not require precisification of each moral concept that it is based on and, even if it did, the theory’s alleged extensional inadequacy does not undermine its justification.

In this paper I argue that libertarianism neither prohibits exchanges in which consent is gained through deceit, nor does it entail that such exchanges are morally invalid. However, contra James Child’s (1994) similar claim, that it is incapable of delivering these verdicts, I argue that libertarians can claim that exchanges involving deceitfully obtained consent are morally invalid by appealing to an external theory of moral permissibility.

How to address invalid reservations has been an ongoing struggle for States, legal practitioners and academics. This article considers the evolution of severability and whether States intend the language of severance to serve as a signal of their view on legality to reserving States or simply use severability to bolster their own public reputation. Over the past decade, State practice toward invalid reservations to norm-creating treaties has shifted and both this shift and its impact on treaty law must be acknowledged. The arguments and assertions that follow rely heavily on contemporary practice relating to reservations made to the core UN human rights treaties which, admittedly, limits the application of the doctrine in many ways. Review of State practice, especially to human rights treaties, demonstrates that a broader number of States are slowly opting for severability when defining their treaty relations with States authoring invalid reservations. The doctrine of severability is gaining a slow but steady following by a growing number of States though there is tension about whether severing reservations is lex specialis, pertaining only to human rights treaties, or lex ferenda. This article examines the evolving practice and forecasts the role it will play in the future of treaty law.