This chapter outlines a theory of moral perception, describes a structural analogy between perception and action, and indicates how perception can provide an objective basis for moral knowledge. It is shown to have a basis in the kinds of grounds that underlie the moral properties to which moral perception responds, such as the violence of a face-slapping. With this outline of a theory of moral perception in view, the chapter describes the presentational phenomenal character of moral perception. Prominent in this presentationality is the phenomenological integration between our moral sensibility and our non-moral perception of the various kinds of natural properties that ground moral properties. Moral perception is possible without moral judgment but commonly yields it. It is also possible without moral emotion but may arise from it in some cases and evoke it in others. Many perceptually grounded judgments are justified; many also express empirical moral knowledge.

To the elemental question of what is the nature of intellectual property, the conventional answer is that it is ‘intangible’ and hence has no physical existence. This is because, it is said, there is a fundamental dichotomy between the immaterial subject matter that is protected by an IP right and its embodiment in some material object. This chapter revisits the elemental question and comes to the conclusion that the conventional view mis-states the position. In particular, while it is true that IP laws recognise something like the tangible/intangible duality, properly understood the rights granted by those laws do not attach to the immaterial subject matter; rather, they attach to the material object in which the subject matter is embodied. More specifically, while the class of things in respect of which IP protection may be granted includes intangibles, it also includes tangibles. Moreover, the things in that class are material – in that they are perceptible by a human sense.