I propose a model analyzing patterns in local compliance in response to requests from intervening COIN allies. I argue four primary variables affect the likelihood of compliance with policies proposed by intervening forces: (1) the capacity of the local partner to implement the requested policy, (2) whether the respective interests of the local and intervening forces converge or diverge over the policy, (3) the dependency of the intervening ally on the local regime to implement the requested policy, and (4) acute external threats from insurgent forces. The theory contends that these are key to understanding the seemingly curious behavior of local COIN partners, who at times seem to undermine the strength of a joint COIN effort by remaining obstinate against key reforms promoted by intervening patrons. Instead of presuming local allies comply with such requests when it is in their interest to do, and refuse when their interests diverge, I argue there is a specific pattern of interaction between interests, and the reliance of foreign intervening forces on local actors to implement policy, that affects the likelihood of compliance by local partners with policy demands.