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1 results

  • 10 - Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality

  • from Part II - The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
  • Edited by Fausto Caruana, Italo Testa, Università degli Studi, Parma
  • Book:
    Habits
    Published online:
    24 November 2020
    Print publication:
    03 December 2020, pp 223-244

  • Summary

    Do nonrepresentational habits display intentionality, in the sense of aiming at, pointing to, or targeting some specific objects? I will here tackle this question from the resources of Dewey's pragmatism, and more precisely from his theory of habits and his functionalist theory of meaning. Meaning, for Dewey, is a normative phenomenon, only occurring in social and linguistic practices. The fact that utterances and thoughts can be about states of affairs does not require a specific mental property of pointing to or targeting for to be explained. Similarly, if behavior and habits can be described as being directed toward objects, this directedness is nothing before or beside the way our actions are normatively framed and organized in certain forms of organism–environment transactions, such as inquiry.