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Chapter 7 - Does analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake?
Edited by Susana Nuccetelli, St Cloud State University, Minnesota, Gary Seay
Book:

Ethical Naturalism

Published online:

05 January 2012

Print publication:

08 December 2011, pp 131-143
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Summary

This chapter argues that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith does after all rest on a mistake, though perhaps not the one G. E. Moore had in mind when he made the naturalistic fallacy charge. Smith outlines a parallel version of analytical naturalism, in the course of suggesting what is for him the only naturalistic moral realist account of the content of moral belief that can safely dodge the bullet aimed by the open question argument (OQA) against naturalistic moral realism. The chapter explains the analytical naturalist claim that some conceptual equivalences hold between predicates in the moral and non-moral vocabularies. On Smith and Jackson's account, since such equivalences are likely to be unobvious, the theory that countenances them is therefore unaffected by Moore's OQA. On the author's view, the analytical naturalist commits a parallel dialectical mistake.