In this chapter, Philipp Kellmeyer discusses how to protect mental privacy and mental integrity in the interaction of AI-based neurotechnology from the perspective of philosophy, ethics, neuroscience, and psychology. The author argues that mental privacy and integrity are important anthropological goods that need to be protected from unjustified interferences. He then outlines the current scholarly discussion and policy initiatives about neurorights and takes the position that while existing human rights provide sufficient legal instruments, an approach is required that makes these rights actionable and justiciable to protect mental privacy and mental integrity, for example, by connecting fundamental rights to specific applied laws.

Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.

Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.

Neurorights are novel human rights that specify areas of protection from potential abuses of neurotechnologies. They protect mental privacy, mental freedom and fair access to neuroenhancement. We discuss neurorights research and advocacy, including the Chilean constitutional amendment and neuroprotection bill of law, which explicitly protect neurorights and adopt a medical model for the regulation of all neurotechnologies, defining them as medical devices. These Chilean bills could serve as a model for legislation elsewhere.