This chapter introduces the concept and practice of security in international relations. It explores the dilemmas faced by states, individuals and the global community by first looking at contemporary crises and disagreements about security; second, examining how security has been differently defined and focused; and third, surveying how different theoretical approaches have understood and analysed security.

The discipline of International Relations owes its origins to the study of war and peace. But are today’s wars so different from their predecessors that we need a new mindset? To answer that question, this chapter begins with warfare’s diverse ends and means before considering five leading issues: the role of violence in warfare; the extent to which that violence is organised; the political nature of war; the interactive nature of warfare; and the scope and scale of war. The argument presented here is that war’s essential features have not changed as much as we might think. This should make us sceptical about claims that the role of war in international relations has somehow been revolutionised.

This chapter examines Australia’s perspectives and strategies on the rules-based order between 2016 and 2020. Australian understanding of the rules-based order were built on US supremacy as well as US-led multilateral institutions, but China’s rise posed serious challenges to both the power configuration and the institutional foundation of that order. Australian leaders believed that the United States would enjoy military advantage over China for decades, so Australia adopted a series of balancing strategies to cope with China’s challenges under the Coalition government. This was evident in a higher military budget, stronger security cooperation with the Quad countries, support for ASEAN’s centrality to Asian diplomacy, coordination of an infrastructure coalition in the South Pacific, and a campaign against the CCP’s ‘sharp power’. Australia pursued balancing strategies against China to defend the existing order, despite the attendant risks to its national interests.

This chapter analyzes the significant changes that have taken place in Danish aid since the 1990s. The historical analysis shows that Denmark forms an exception to “Scandinavian exceptionalism,” with its approach historically much more characterized by pragmatism, mercantilism and subservience to international trends. Though sometimes presented as such, Danish aid today appears neither altruistic, idealist, nor driven by exceptional motives of humanitarianism. We thus show that Danish aid is less a reflection of a political ambition to brand Denmark internationally as a humanitarian frontrunner, and more a by-product of unfolding domestic political priorities influenced by international events and contingent changes. More so than the end of aid then, today is what we may call a new time of pragmatic ambiguity, drawing on “old” ideas, whether self-interest, tied aid or (domestic) political instrumentalization of aid.

Collectively, developing countries are the source of one-third of the global pollution causing climate change. If one classifies China as a developing country, then all developing countries combined currently produce about two-thirds of global greenhouse gas pollution. Their emissions are on course to rise without far more effective governance measures. Thus, the future of climate governance, and indeed of the climate crisis, will very much depend on whether more attention is given to what is happening in developing countries. Vitally, many of these countries are the most vulnerable to climate change. For some of them, climate change is becoming an existential threat, as it certainly will be for millions, and potentially hundreds of millions, of their citizens. Developing countries are in precarious positions in the context of global climate governance. For a few economically emerging countries, such as India, their contribution to climate change is very substantial, but the least developed countries of the world, and many small and highly vulnerable island states are often hapless victims of a problem created almost entirely by others.

A picture that emerges is one of national interests being perceived, for reasons arising almost exclusively from national politics, in ways that effectively discount the threat of climate change. Climate change has been on the national agenda for decades, but national politics has repeatedly prevented it from being interpreted as a vital national interest by most national governments. Most countries still perceive the risk of acting to address climate effectively as being a threat to their economies, or at least to powerful economic actors. This does not necessarily cause them to ignore climate change, but it does result, at best, in watered-down climate policies. A question is whether this picture of national politics reveals widespread pathologies of climate governance in developed countries. This chapter aims to start answering this question by looking at the governance of climate change in the European Union, Russia, Australia, Canada and Japan. This gives a picture of how pathologies of national politics influence climate governance globally. Climate change is perceived to be a national interest to the extent that national politics determine it to be so.

This chapter describes the basic features and lasting influence on climate governance of the international system of states. When the problem of climate change became apparent, countries responded to it through diplomacy leading to international agreements for collective action. This chapter describes major aspects of this process. It summarizes how countries have negotiated a regime of international agreements and institutions intended to address climate change collectively and individually. A quarter-century was devoted to top-down measures – internationally agreed conventions and protocols setting out allowable greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries. More recently, the focus has been on bottom-up measures – nationally determined contributions to wider global efforts to govern climate change. While these efforts have resulted in a wide array of actions around the world to address climate change, they also demonstrate concretely the ways in which the international system, and the countries operating within it, have precluded aggressive collective action.

This chapter identifies a number of prescriptions for climate governance that could, alongside other actions being taken worldwide, mitigate the climate crisis. Success in this regard would entail dramatic and quite rapid declines in greenhouse gas pollution globally and successful adaptation to the impacts arising from past pollution. These outcomes would engender greater protection of human interests and substantial reductions in the many injustices arising from climate change, all while enhancing environmental sustainability in the long term. The prescriptions outlined here are intended to address corresponding governance pathologies described in Chapters 3–7. Before these prescriptions can be applied in practice, much more explication would be required. Thus, they are intended to illustrate the kinds of steps that will be required to make climate governance much more effective. All of these prescriptions for climate governance are aspirations: they are proposals for action that will have practical significance for the climate crisis only if they are taken seriously.