The theoretical framework of collective equality changes how tensions between power-sharing arrangements and human rights are viewed: Instead of a dilemma of peace versus justice, it is framed as between two conceptions of justice as we evaluate power-sharing and other collective measures as a way for promoting justice (in addition to peace). This chapter brings the collective equality framework into the legal debate and explores its key implications for human rights law. It also offers an alternative way to mitigate the tensions between existing international law (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1) and contemporary peacemaking practice, which is more apt to the contemporary task of international law: regulating disputes and conflicting demands made by ethno-national groups. This proposed framework aims to contribute to an already happening shift, from a state-centered interpretation of the right to self-determination to a more nuanced and substantive understanding of that right as an international legal right of peoples to secure their freedom and equality.

This chapter substantiates the argument that promoting collective equality as a core rationale of peacemaking is not only utopian, but a realistic goal that corresponds with reducing the likelihood of violent conflict and increasing the potential for durable peace. In the first part of the chapter, the argument that collective equality posits a realistic goal for peacemaking is presented. In the second part, the claim that promoting collective equality should be regarded as an effective peacebuilding strategy is promoted. I base this claim on empirical findings found in the literature, mainly writings on ethnic conflicts, nation-building, and peace. Lastly, the chapter engages with three possible objections related to the relationship between collective equality and power politics.

A central criticism of power-sharing arrangements, and especially of their ethnic-corporate versions, is that they violate the basic principle of equality and nondiscrimination. The case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, submitted in 2006 and delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2009, vividly illustrates this problem. In this case, the ECtHR struck down central features of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s power-sharing arrangements on the grounds that they breached the right to nondiscrimination with regard to participation in elections for the legislature and presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To better understand the legal analysis and normative assumptions underlying this prominent perception of power-sharing arrangements, and to explore its shortcomings that the concept of collective equality aims to address, this chapter presents the ECtHR rulings regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional arrangements and the criticisms raised against it. It shows how the legal framing portrays the conflict as another version of the peace versus justice debate, in which human rights obligations represent the demands of justice, while power-sharing arrangements represent the unavoidable, though regrettable (in terms of justice), price of peace. This legal appraisal, the chapter argues, avoids a central and crucial normative feature of the situation – the “elephant in the room” of national self-determination in multinational places.

This chapter opens the third part of the book in which a new theoretical account called collective equality is offered. At the core of collective equality, we find a recognition of the centrality of collectives and their equal relations as the primary pillar of justice and peace. Deeply divided places riven by ethno-national conflicts are characterized not only by national divide, but most often by practices of discrimination, political exclusion, and domination of one ethno-national group over the other(s). While the national divide itself is unlikely to disappear in such places, the way in which the ethno-national “border” is managed, or in other words how the groups and their members relate and interact, can dramatically change. Alongside liberal multiculturalism and liberal nationalism, collective equality introduces the paradigm of equality between the national groups that occupy a specific territory. In the realities of conflict-riven places, this new paradigm must respond to concerns that lay at the root of contemporary conflicts – the objection to or fear of foreign domination – common to both national minorities and national majorities caught in an “intimate conflict.”