This chapter starts by framing the larger debate concerning universalism versus contextualism in ethics, largely mirroring the one between positivism and relativism in science. It proposes that pragmatism transcends this dichotomy by considering the role of general (and particular) ethical norms and values in context and by focusing on moral deliberation. The pragmatist approach to ethics is described before discussing the ways in which ethical concerns and forms of reasoning accompany every phase of a research project. The practice of using deception, which is both widespread and controversial in social and psychological research, is reflected upon. Finally, the chapter ends with considerations regarding mixed methods, multi-resolution designs, and their ethical commitments.

As John Dewey observed, and contemporary moral psychology confirms, most of our moral deliberation and judgment operates via deeply rooted habits of perception, discrimination, and valuing over which we have little conscious control. These processes are intuitive, automatic, and seldom subject to reflective change. However, we are not just condemned to our reinforced biases, because we are also creatures whose brains exhibit a measure of plasticity, or what Dewey called “habits of flexibility.” Good moral deliberation, therefore, is intelligent reconstruction of habits, and the formation of new habits that make it possible for us to deal constructively with new moral problems that confront us. Moral deliberation of this sort is a process of dramatic imaginative rehearsal of possibilities for conscientiously transforming our habits, in order to deal with the new problems that arise from changed conditions. Conscientiousness is a flexible habit of reflective, empathic, and critical moral inquiry.