The monetary authority’s choice of operating procedure has significant implications for the role of monetary aggregates and interest rate policy on the business cycle. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that the type of endogenous monetary regime, together with the interaction between money supply and demand, does well to capture the actual behavior of a monetary economy—the USA. The results suggest that the evolution toward a stricter interest rate-targeting regime renders central bank balance sheet expansions ineffective. In the context of the 2007–2009 Great Recession, a more flexible interest rate-targeting regime would have led to a significant monetary expansion and more rapid economic recovery in the USA.

In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam and London developed distinctive innovations in finance through both banks and markets that facilitated the growth of trade in each city. In the eighteenth century, a symbiotic relation developed that led to bank-oriented finance in Amsterdam cooperating with market-oriented finance in London. The relationship that emerged allowed each to rise to unprecedented dominance in Europe, while the respective financial innovations in each city provided the means for the continued expansion of European trade, both within Europe and with the rest of the world. The increasing strains of war finance for the competing European powers over the course of the eighteenth century stimulated fresh financial innovations in each city that initially reinforced the symbiosis of the two centers. The external shocks arising from revolutionary movements in America and France, however, interrupted the relationship long enough to leave London as the supreme financial center.

Monetary policy should be guided by macroeconomic models with limited nominal rigidity; ‘New Classical’ or even for some issues just plain Classical (i.e. with no nominal rigidity at all) models are perfectly adequate for understanding various aspects of the economy that have previously led economists to believe in a high degree of nominal rigidity. On UK data these models account for the facts of inflation persistence and exchange rate ‘overshooting’; their impulse responses are in line with the data; and a typical example, the Liverpool Model, is marginally accepted in its entirety by the data since 1979. Such models suggest that no increased macro instability would result from taking the rigours of monetary policy one stage further from inflation targeting and ensuring that the price level itself is returned to its long-run preset target path — so that the value of money over long periods of time would be utterly predictable.