Over the past twenty years, minimum income schemes (MIS) have undergone major transformations in their functions and role. From mainly residual instruments that aimed to guarantee minimum income support and to prevent extreme marginality, in most countries they now have an ambiguous function of providing income support and favouring social and labour market inclusion. Against this background, this article provides an analytical grid that allows describing the different features of last-resort safety nets across Europe, building on the definition of key main dimensions of variation of MISs in Europe – generosity, eligibility and conditionality requirements, institutional configuration, active inclusion profiles. Then, it introduces a new typology of MIS in Europe, building on a new dataset with data on expenditures and coverage collected from National Statistical Offices.

Italy and Poland present similarly weak minimum income protection models, yet this results from two different policy trajectories in the last 15 years: both countries actually introduced a minimum income scheme (MIS) between the late 1990s (Italy) and the early 2000s (Poland), but later developments were characterized by policy reversal in the Italian case vis-à-vis institutionalization in Poland. The paper therefore addresses two intertwined puzzles. First, in the light of very different background conditions, which factors help understand the convergent process towards the introduction of MIS? Second, what explains remarkable divergence in the subsequent phase? Challenging previous claims about the limited scope of political competition dynamics in the field of social assistance, due to generally narrow constituencies and limited political mobilization, we contend that political competition dynamics are key factors in order to make sense of both convergent and divergent trajectories in the two diverse phases.