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Rorty’s only extensive and systematic treatment of Saul Kripke’s work, “Kripke on Mind-Body Identity” puts Kripke’s arguments back into an often overlooked historical and philosophical context that sheds new light on them and their viability and overall significance. Anyone interested in mind-brain identity theory, in particular, those who think it was shown to be untenable by Kripke’s criticisms and remain puzzled by its still being alive and well, will appreciate Rorty’s explanations why those criticisms, in fact, must “leave the issue about mind-body identity where it stood.” Rorty predicts that in the wake of Kripke’s criticisms, “The old issues will go over into the new vocabulary – with less talk about meaning and more about reference, but without dialectical loss to either side.”
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