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2 results

  • Love and Justice: a Paradox?

  • Anca Gheaus
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 47 / Issue 6 / 2017
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 739-759

  • Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.

  • 1 - Introduction: Social primary goods and capabilities as metrics of justice

    • By Ingrid Robeyns, Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Harry Brighouse, Professor of Philosophy at University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Edited by Harry Brighouse, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Ingrid Robeyns, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book:
    Measuring Justice
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    28 January 2010, pp 1-14

  • Summary

    This chapter outlines the systematic study of social primary goods approach and the capability approach to measuring justice. One way in which political theorists and philosophers have responded to the debate between Rawls and Amartya Sen is by defending the social primary goods or the capability approach on grounds of their theoretical properties. In her contribution, Elizabeth Anderson sets herself the task of defending the capability approach, in particular her own version of the approach (Anderson 1999), against Pogge's criticism. The book Measuring Justice closes with an essay in which Sen reflects on the influence of John Rawls on his own thinking, and on the contributions in the first part of the volume. The essay clearly illustrates the absence of consensus among political theorists and philosophers about whether either the social primary goods approach or the capability approach is to be preferred as a metric of justice.