This chapter explores the role of context in the computation of implicit pragmatic meanings (implicatures). In the classic view of Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics, conversational implicatures are triggered by the Cooperative Principle and the maxims of conversation, and are defined as non-contextual, with the exception of particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs). On the other hand, it is assumed that generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) and conventional implicatures (CIs) are not contextual, although GCIs can be defeated by the context or denied by the speaker. This non-contextual approach to pragmatics (the Gricean turn) has given rise to a default approach to implicatures. The second purpose of this chapter is to tackle the contextual dimension of neo-Gricean pragmatics, which has been developed by exponents of neo-Gricean pragmatics. Their approaches to pragmatics, limited to GCIs as scalar implicatures, are based either on pragmatic principles, the Q-Principle and R- or I-principle (Horn, Levinson), or on the reformulation of conversational maxims and reasoning (Gazdar, Chierchia, Fox). It is argued that the focus on GCIs, although it should minimize the role of context in the generation of implicatures, demonstrates on the contrary the pervasive function of context, which is not limited to implicature cancellation.

In this chapter, we introduce the influential work of H. Paul Grice, focusing on his claims about indirectly communicated meaning. Grice is generally acknowledged as the first person to propose an account of how hearers derive implied meaning. He coined the now widely accepted term implicature to describe any proposition that is communicated without being directly stated, and he offered an account of how hearers derive implicatures by working out what a speaker meant to communicate beyond what has been directly and explicitly stated in an utterance. We begin this chapter by exploring Grice’s distinction between ‘what is said’ and what is implicated. We then move on to discuss his cooperative principle (CP) and its associated maxims. Speakers, it is claimed, abide by certain norms when they take part in a conversation. We outline Grice’s formulation of these norms, and the role they play in inferential processes and implicature derivation. The chapter closes with a discussion of the different categories of implicature that Grice identified. We look at examples to illustrate the role that context plays in inferential processes for each category of implicature.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.