In the summer of 1997, a member of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia met with Slavko Dokmanović in Serbia in order to lure him into Croatia, where he was ultimately arrested by UN peacekeeping personnel, Dokmanović was the subject of a sealed indictment for his role in the execution of 261 people forcibly taken out of the Vukovar hospital in 1991. The Tribunal rejected Dokmanović's argument that the manner of his arrest violated the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and international law. In doing so, the Tribunal focused on the distinction between ‘luring’ and ‘forcible abduction’, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter might, constitute grounds for dismissal in a future case. The article argues that the Tribunal's decision rests on an artificial distinction between luring and abduction which may needlessly discourage future apprehensions undertaken by NATO and UN troops in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. What the Tribunal in Dokmanović should have focused on, is that there is no violation of international law where the Security Council or the Tribunal has authorised law enforcement activities, where the state has consented to such activities, or where such activities are necessary under the principle of self-defence. Moreover, even where the manner of apprehension violates international law, the Tribunal may apply the so-called ‘Eichmann-exception’, while at the same time recognising that the mala captus bene dententus principle is generally inconsistent with the modern law of human rights.
