Moving from the grand and abstract theme of international constitutionalization to the more tangible and observable process of international rule making, Chapter 5 analyzes states’ motives for cooperating over international rules that form the unintended basis of international constitutionalization. It lays out the logic of democratic power, according to which states that are both democratic and powerful (democratic powers) combine the willingness and ability to promote international rules. Because democracies are rule–based, they understand the value of operating through rules and doing so is consistent with their domestic operations. Insofar as they are also powerful, democracies are able to advance their rule–based approach at the international level to shape rules according to their interests and values, which makes it easier for them to commit to and follow those rules. Democratic powers are thus decisive for international rule–based cooperation. States that lack either one or both of these prerequisites are less supportive of institutionalized cooperation and thus constitutionalization in world politics.